Tempo de leitura: 11 minutos<\/small><\/p>
Having shared\u00a0its destiny with bullying neighbor China through every twist and turn of its history, Vietnam understands that the stronger China gets, the more serious of a potential threat Vietnam faces. Because of this, when China began to intensify both its military presence\u00a0on its occupied features in the\u00a0Paracel and Spratly Islands and its water-grabbing in the Mekong \u2013 strategic moves\u00a0which appeared to seriously threaten to Vietnam\u2019s security \u2013 Hanoi proactively mobilized to reach out to extra-regional powers to broaden its options.<\/p>\n
Vietnamese leaders acknowledge that boosting economic development via \u201cself-strengthening\u201d strategies is a vital push to modernize the country\u2019s economy and defense alike \u2014 and thus help Vietnam exit China\u2019s orbit of influence.<\/p>\n
However, for a nation heavily dependent on export-processing and labor-intensive industries \u2013 sectors that consume huge amount of energy and natural resources, but are not environmentally friendly \u2013 for national growth, increased environmental pollution and natural resource degradation appear to threaten Vietnam\u2019s decades-long economic progress, and thus undermine its newfound strength.<\/p>\n
The\u00a0failure of recent risky and ill-conceived economic policies<\/a>\u00a0to progress the country\u2019s economy has shifted attention to the emergence of economic enclave initiatives. The success stories from special economic zones (SEZs) in China in particular have inspired the Vietnamese government to bet on the success of SEZ initiatives, which display the potential to implement social innovation, economic modernization, and institutional progress from the \u201cbottom up.\u201d Since the first three new SEZs are proposed to be officially established in January 2019, there are a few months left for the Vietnamese government and people to prepare for this event, which might go down as one of the momentous turning-points in Vietnam\u2019s post-war economic development.<\/p>\n This article, the first of a three-part series, looks back at the past and recent developments and incidents to understand the country\u2019s dilemma and the long road to put the SEZ concept into practice.<\/p>\n Vietnam\u2019s Dilemma: More Economic Zones, More Incentives, But Less Progressive Impacts<\/strong><\/p>\n Developing prominent economic enclaves is not a new idea in Vietnam. The country had established its first SEZ in Con Dao Islands (part of today Ba Ria-Vung Tau Province) in 1979 to promote and facilitate the petroleum industry. But the SEZ soon proved unable to have a tangible effect on economic and social mindsets across the country. It also failed to support the petroleum industry, whose fast-paced growth completely relied upon available great potential in oil and gas reserves and foreign aid. Thus, the SEZ was terminated in 1991 in view of its failure.<\/p>\n During the 1990s, Phu Quoc Island and Hai Phong City were planned to become the next SEZs with outstanding incentives, more\u00a0free market-oriented economic policies, and flexible governmental measures, but all of these plans fell through due to budget and political constraints.<\/p>\n Since its full normalization of relations with China in 1991, Vietnam has kick-started intensive industrialization characterized by the proliferation of four national-level key economic regions and 18 coastal economic zones, where about 325 industrial parks have been built. These zones are allowed to enjoy a range of specific economic management and privileges to attract foreign investment and technology. In the end, however, these industrialized zones brought about \u201cfactory-driven\u201d economic growth, but\u00a0not economic development<\/a>.<\/p>\n Resurgence of SEZs in the Face of Emerging Grassroots Democracy<\/strong><\/p>\n Vietnam\u2019s impressive economic performance \u2014 a period of sustained high growth since the early 1990s \u2014 hasn\u2019t allowed it to close the development gap vis-\u00e0-vis China. As a result, Hanoi seems to have few options for dealing with the economic vulnerabilities it faces from China. Meanwhile, Cambodia and Myanmar are emerging as possible replacements for low-cost manufacturing and assembly, and thus challenging Vietnam\u2019s position in attracting foreign investment flows to sustain national growth.<\/p>\n This situation led the country\u2019s leaders and elites back to an ambitious plan for SEZs, which they hope will spearhead the country\u2019s fast-paced growth, facilitating the economy\u2019s shift to a knowledge economy (Industry 4.0) in a few decades to come. To that end, the government plans to develop three SEZs in the coastal districts of Van Don in the Gulf of Tonkin, Bac Van Phong in the central province of Khanh Hoa, and Phu Quoc Island in the Gulf of Thailand. Though the logic behind these choices remains\u00a0controversial<\/a>, Hanoi has demonstrated its willpower to\u00a0move forward.<\/p>\n To\u00a0legitimize\u00a0their SEZ plan, Prime Minister Nguyen Xuan Phuc\u2019s administration compiled a draft law on SEZs, which aims to create a breakthrough in development for these regions and build outstanding institutions in order for the country to be internationally competitive. It was scheduled to be adopted by Vietnam\u2019s National Assembly, on June 15, 2018. However, a few days prior to the Parliament\u2019s approval, the government was confronted by a rising tide of public anger from those who see the bill as selling out Vietnamese land to China.<\/p>\n In the face of mounting opposition, the Government Office in Hanoi released a hasty announcement at\u00a03:00 a.m. on Saturday, June 9<\/a>, saying that the state had agreed to delay the approval of the draft law in order for lawmakers and leaders to have more time to scrutinize people\u2019s enthusiastic contributions. Now the draft law will be submitted for the National Assembly\u2019s final decision in October 2018. This move was viewed by many as a rarity for a government that seldom solicits or heeds public opinion. It was a timely \u201ctemporization,\u201d or concession, meant to avoid a repeat of the bloody and devastating riots in\u00a02014<\/a>\u00a0and\u00a02016<\/a>\u00a0that left dozens of people dead and did far-reaching damage to the economy.<\/p>\n Despite the government\u2019s attempts to allay public concerns, a series of demonstrations still took place for three days (from June 9-11) in many major cities and economic hubs throughout the country. Some of these protests quickly turned violent, targeting the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) and\u00a0local authorities<\/a>.<\/p>\n Although late in the game and facing many challenges due to increased global competition, scarcity of resources, and political and social complexities, the Vietnamese government remains determined to develop SEZs. However, with only limited introduction of new investment incentives, the draft SEZ legislation reads like a duplication of the most favorable conditions in the framework of the existing law already being implemented in the country\u2019s key economic zones.<\/p>\n What is significantly new in the bill is that it would allow foreign investors to obtain 99-year leases in some cases approved by the prime minister in the three SEZs. The bill does not explicitly mention any particular potential foreign investors that could lease land for up to 99 years in the zones, but it is widely presumed that China, Vietnam\u2019s largest trading partner and perennial political influencer, would be probably the main beneficiary dominating investments in the SEZs.<\/p>\n With the SEZ law viewed in this light, along with the memories of the 1979 border war and China\u2019s current encroachment in the South China Sea, the Vietnamese people fear that these strategically important zones would soon become China\u2019s neocolonial territories, posing an extreme threat to the country\u2019s national security and sovereignty.<\/p>\n It\u2019s also worth observing that the recent public protests, though certainly marked by nationalist and anti-China rhetoric, were not just jingoism or patriotism. As well as the numerous anti-China signs at the protests, there were also a number of placards that demanded greater democracy, criticized the VCP, and questioned the ruling Communist Party\u2019s legitimacy \u2013 which, as noted by\u00a0state media<\/a>, some anti-Communist Vietnamese organizations may have played a role in.<\/p>\n The past few years have witnessed an increasing number of mass protests across Vietnam, in which the majority of protestors are workers and ordinary people. Chauvinistic posturing against Beijing is certainly there. But there are other accounts of what has triggered these protests that would also better explain why they tend to become so large and so violent. (The anti-governmental\u00a0rioting in Binh Thuan<\/a>\u00a0on June 10, 2018, is a good example).<\/p>\n First, long-lasting complaints about bad workplace conditions at, Chinese overseers\u2019 bullying management in, and serious environmental pollution from Chinese- and Taiwanese-owned factories remain unsettled by the government agencies. Second, Vietnam\u2019s economy is booming \u2013 but so is inequality and corruption, although the government has made strides in both. These intractable issues appear to weaken public faith in the government and the ruling Party.<\/p>\n Third, the land ownership prescribed by current law and constitution is another source causing widespread discontent toward the government, particularly when the government\u2019s compensation or resettlement schemes do not meet landowners\u2019 basic needs. Last but not least, it will be easy for protesters to paint the government as weak on the South China Sea (by failing to protect Vietnamese fishermen from\u00a0frequent attacks<\/a>\u00a0launched by Chinese forces) and remiss at home (for failing to prevent Chinese migrants from\u00a0illegally occupying coastal land plots<\/a>\u00a0across Vietnam).<\/p>\n Civil resistance to enforce policy changes is uncommon in Vietnam. The public tends to be quiescent, given the traditional notion that the state leads and all should follow. But the recent flurry of public interest shows that ordinary people are becoming more vocal and underscores the popular fury over the dangers threatening the country\u2019s interests and sovereignty. Not only does this demonstrate that the ruling CPV and its government are not all powerful and no longer remain a monopoly on power, but such civil disobedience is likely to turn into worse actions if the state authorities fail to thoroughly address public concerns as well as connect citizen interests to a broader view of the country\u2019s development process.<\/p>\n Even though the recent public demonstrations remain an inchoate, poorly organized sense of anger, they display an emerging pro-rights and democracy awareness among the Vietnamese people. On the other hand, the vandalism and rioting \u2013 partly against China but more urgently against the SEZ law proposed by Hanoi government \u2013 send an ominous signal of a looming resurgence of so-called \u201ccolor revolution\u201d in the country. For this reason, a wrong move or miscalculation from the government could stir up a perfect storm of anti-regime protest.<\/p>\n Final Thoughts<\/strong><\/p>\n The Vietnamese government has shown a strong desire to develop SEZs, where it hopes a range of favorable incentives and unique economic regulations will in turn spearhead fast-paced growth at the local, subnational, and national levels respectively. However, while rapid changes in the global trends of finance, technology, and economic policy all appear to threaten the policy\u2019s success, domestic challenges soon after the SEZ draft law was released add another danger.<\/p>\n The Communist Party of Vietnam and its government are now facing a dilemma on how to pass the law without losing sight of the need to generously incentivize investors while quieting the public anger and reviving their trust in the communist regime. Civil resistance may occur again and lead to political unrest if the new version of the draft law does not address the concerns of voters. As an organization that claims to be the living embodiment of the people\u2019s will, the ruling Party seems to have no choice but to rule out the controversial articles and clarify their commitment to national interests and security in the draft, as Prime Minister Nguyen Xuan Phuc vowed when asked by\u00a0state media<\/a>. Such a choice won\u2019t be easy for Vietnamese leaders, since reducing such terms could limit the ability of SEZs to attract foreign investment, especially potential bigger investors from China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan who are expected to dominate and thus ensure success of the zones.<\/p>\n Openness and liberalization, among other measures, are determinants of the new-generation of SEZs. These will definitely accelerate the evolution of democracy in and outside the economic enclaves. Thus, the recent public opposition can be seen as a litmus test for Hanoi\u2019s readiness to meet the people\u2019s increasing expectations \u2013 both economic and political \u2013 fueled by rising standards of living and greater access to educational opportunities associated with global neoliberalization.<\/p>\n Leia mais<\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" 11 minutos<\/small> Having shared\u00a0its destiny with bullying neighbor China through every twist and turn of its history, Vietnam understands that the stronger China gets, the more serious of a potential threat Vietnam faces. Because of this, when China began to intensify both its military presence\u00a0on its occupied features in the\u00a0Paracel and Spratly Islands and its water-grabbing in the Mekong \u2013 strategic moves\u00a0which appeared to seriously threaten to Vietnam\u2019s security \u2013 Hanoi proactively mobilized to reach out to extra-regional powers to broaden its options. Vietnamese Continue lendo<\/span>\u2192<\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":4,"featured_media":2006,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[5],"tags":[],"class_list":["entry","author-adm_hb2018","post-2108","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","category-artigos"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.abrazpe.org.br\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2108","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.abrazpe.org.br\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.abrazpe.org.br\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.abrazpe.org.br\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/4"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.abrazpe.org.br\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=2108"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/www.abrazpe.org.br\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2108\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":2109,"href":"https:\/\/www.abrazpe.org.br\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2108\/revisions\/2109"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.abrazpe.org.br\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/2006"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.abrazpe.org.br\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=2108"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.abrazpe.org.br\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=2108"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.abrazpe.org.br\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=2108"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}