{"id":3762,"date":"2020-07-18T00:41:03","date_gmt":"2020-07-18T03:41:03","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.abrazpe.org.br\/?p=3762"},"modified":"2020-07-18T00:41:04","modified_gmt":"2020-07-18T03:41:04","slug":"south-east-asian-special-economic-zones-are-becoming-geopolitical","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.abrazpe.org.br\/index.php\/2020\/07\/18\/south-east-asian-special-economic-zones-are-becoming-geopolitical\/","title":{"rendered":"South-East Asian special economic zones are becoming geopolitical"},"content":{"rendered":"<p class=\"estimated-read-time\">Tempo de leitura:<small> 6 minutos<\/small><\/p> \n<p>According to the latest World Bank\u2019s \u201c<a href=\"https:\/\/www.worldbank.org\/en\/publication\/global-economic-prospects\">Global Economic Prospects<\/a>\u201d publication, Covid-19 pandemic will have a negative impact on East Asia causing a&nbsp;<strong>-1,2% GDP\u2019s reduction in 2020<\/strong>, that is the region\u2019s first recession since 1998\u2019s Asian financial crisis, while China is expected to slow to 1% this year. Among the various consequences that may materialise, the report highlights the disruption of the global and regional value chains. In addition, as stated by&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/unctad.org\/en\/PublicationsLibrary\/wir2020_en.pdf\">UNCTAD World Investment Report 2020<\/a>&nbsp;Foreign Direct Investments\u2019 (FDIs) flows are expected to decrease globally by 40% in 2020 and are projected to decrease by a further 5 to 10% in 2021.&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>This scenario would be&nbsp;<strong>detrimental for East Asia\u2019s economies and especially for the network of Special Economic Zones (SEZs)<\/strong>&nbsp;located there, which have had and continue to play a fundamental part in the region\u2019s growth. SEZs are&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/unctad.org\/en\/PublicationChapters\/WIR2019_CH4.pdf\">intended<\/a>&nbsp;as delimited areas within a country\u2019s national borders where businesses enjoy a more favourable regulatory and fiscal regime than that of the national territory, with the aim to draw in FDIs, boost exports, increase trade balance and alleviate unemployment.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Of the&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/unctad.org\/en\/pages\/newsdetails.aspx?OriginalVersionID=2108\">5,400 SEZs<\/a>&nbsp;existing worldwide, three quarters are located in Asia. This balance can be explained by the historical role that these economic enclaves have played in the continent\u2019s development, and especially in that of East and Southeast Asia. In the late \u201860 ASEAN states inaugurated a series of \u201cExport Processing Zones\u201d, that can be considered the early model of SEZs. The aim was to attract foreign multinational corporations willing to relocate abroad their&nbsp;<strong>labor-intensive activities, notably in the textile and electronic sectors<\/strong>. The experience proved to be&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.jstor.org\/stable\/40439205?seq=1\">successful<\/a>, making the region an important hub within the global value chains.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The true watershed in SEZs\u2019 history, however, is linked to China. In 1979, Chinese authorities designed the first SEZs as a consequence of Deng Xiaoping\u2019s \u201c<a href=\"https:\/\/www.lincolninst.edu\/sites\/default\/files\/pubfiles\/2261_1600_Zeng_WP13DZ1.pdf\">Open Door<\/a>\u201d policy. The main rationale was to end political and economic isolation by&nbsp;<strong>reforming and opening up the Chinese economy through the attraction of FDIs<\/strong>. In order to foster economic growth and enable the country to compete with both industrialized western powers and emerging regional powers such as Japan and Korea, the government established four coastal SEZs in Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Shantou and Xiamen.&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>SEZs\u2019 special regulatory regime enabled China to experiment with market-oriented reforms in these circumscribed areas. The experiment proved to be a breakthrough. According to a 2015\u2019s&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.worldbank.org\/content\/dam\/Worldbank\/Event\/Africa\/Investing%20in%20Africa%20Forum\/2015\/investing-in-africa-forum-chinas-special-economic-zone.pdf\">World Bank<\/a>&nbsp;report, national SEZs accounted for&nbsp;<strong>22% of China\u2019s GDP, 45% of total national FDIs and 60% of exports<\/strong>, creating over 30 million jobs and accelerating industrialization, agricultural modernization and urbanization.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Beijing\u2019s successful experience served as&nbsp;<strong>example for other economies in Southeast Asia<\/strong>. Starting from the \u201890 the region witnessed a new wave of SEZs based on China\u2019s model, especially in the new ASEAN members (Vietnam, Laos, Myanmar and Cambodia). This novel type of SEZs thrived also in this context, especially due to the ability to catalyse FDIs.&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>In 2018 the region&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/unctad.org\/en\/pages\/newsdetails.aspx?OriginalVersionID=2112\">received<\/a>&nbsp;a record 149 billion $ in investments from abroad, consolidating the growing trend of the previous years. The close&nbsp;<strong>link between this FDI inflow and SEZs<\/strong>&nbsp;can be best understood by highlighting the Philippines\u2019 case, where around 74% of FDIs between 2010 and 2017 can be directly&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.deepdyve.com\/lp\/university-of-california-press\/leveraging-sezs-for-regional-integration-in-asean-a-synergistic-DxUIpcV64F?articleList=%2Fsearch%3Fquery%3Dasean%2Bsez\">linked<\/a>&nbsp;to its SEZs, with other states in the area having similar numbers. Hence, it comes at no surprise that nowadays the number of SEZs in ASEAN is significant and constantly on the rise. According to the latest&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.aseanbriefing.com\/news\/special-economic-zones-in-asean-opportunities-for-us-investors\/\">dat<\/a><a href=\"https:\/\/www.aseanbriefing.com\/news\/special-economic-zones-in-asean-opportunities-for-us-investors\/\">a<\/a>, today the region hosts more than one hundred major SEZs and hundreds more of minor size, with others being established, especially in frontier markets as&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/opendevelopmentmyanmar.net\/topics\/special-economic-zones\/\">Myanmar<\/a>&nbsp;and&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.thestar.com.my\/news\/regional\/2020\/02\/06\/special-economic-zones-in-laos-attract-huge-investments-and-create-jobs\">Laos<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>China has been playing a major part in Southeast Asia\u2019s SEZs development. In 2006, Chinese government announced the&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/unctad.org\/en\/PublicationChapters\/WIR2019_CH4.pdf\">Overseas Economic Cooperation Zones programme<\/a>&nbsp;aimed at establishing SEZs abroad through&nbsp;<strong>state-supported joint ventures between Chinese companies and local players<\/strong>. Since then, a considerable share of Chinese FDIs in the region has been allocated to these areas, where Chinese enterprises benefit of a favourable environment. Recently, following Chinese economy\u2019s slowdown, weakening consumer demand and growth of unemployment, SEZs have become even more central for Beijing\u2019s&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.economist.com\/asia\/2020\/01\/30\/south-east-asia-is-sprouting-chinese-enclaves\">strategy<\/a>&nbsp;of expanding its economic presence abroad within the&nbsp;<strong>Belt and Road Initiative\u2019s framework<\/strong>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Besides fostering China\u2019s business interests, in recent times Southeast Asia\u2019s SEZs have started to play a paramount role in the Great Power&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.brookings.edu\/research\/beyond-binary-choices-navigating-great-power-competition-in-southeast-asia\/\">geopolitical competition<\/a>&nbsp;that is unfolding in the region. This is true especially for the&nbsp;<strong>growing China-Japan<\/strong><strong><a href=\"https:\/\/www.ispionline.it\/it\/pubblicazione\/friends-or-foes-china-and-japans-southeast-asian-battleground-22859\">rivalry<\/a><\/strong>. Even if the main geoeconomic field of competition is the&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.tandfonline.com\/doi\/abs\/10.1080\/10670564.2018.1557946?journalCode=cjcc20\">infrastructure<\/a>&nbsp;sector, a similar pattern can be observed with SEZs.&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>A case in point is Cambodia. Japanese companies were among the first to invest in the country when in 2005 Phnom Penh\u2019s government&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.adb.org\/sites\/default\/files\/publication\/175236\/ewp-459.pdf\">introduced<\/a>&nbsp;these special areas. However, recently Beijing has overtaken Tokyo as the country\u2019s main investor, with Chinese FDIs&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.adrianoplegroup.com\/post\/phnom-penh-sez-japans-special-economic-zone-in-cambodia\">doubling<\/a>&nbsp;in 2018 alone. The fact that China is gaining ground can be observed by comparing the cases of the Tokyo-funded Sihanoukville Port SEZ and the Beijing-funded Sihanoukville SEZ.&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The former can be considered a fiasco, because in 2018 only 3 companies were operating there, while the latter is enjoining a considerable success, with more than&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/asia.nikkei.com\/Business\/Company-in-focus\/Cambodia-s-biggest-port-sees-China-coveting-Japan-s-dominant-role\">one hundred<\/a>enterprises. This different outcome can be explained by the fact that Sihanoukville SEZ is the first economic area developed following a&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.ifri.org\/en\/publications\/notes-de-lifri\/asie-visions\/catching-or-staying-ahead-japanese-investment-mekong-region\">bilateral deal<\/a>&nbsp;between Chinese and Cambodian governments, testifying so Beijing&#8217;s special attention to these areas.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Lastly, SEZs have also a&nbsp;<strong>key strategic importance for China<\/strong>. The country faces the so-called \u201c<a href=\"https:\/\/jamestown.org\/program\/chinas-malacca-dilemma\/\">Malacca dilemma<\/a>\u201d, that is the geopolitical problem caused by the fact that the majority of its imports (especially oil) passes through this chokepoint. Lately, Beijing\u2019s authorities have been trying to reduce the over-dependence from this passage by&nbsp;<strong>developing alternative routes<\/strong>. In this context, the role of Myanmar\u2019s Kyaukpyu SEZ is paramount. Situated in the bay of Bengal in the Indian Ocean, the area is set to become the sea terminal of the&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.wilsoncenter.org\/blog-post\/china-myanmar-economic-corridor-and-chinas-determination-see-it-through\">China-Myanmar economic corridor<\/a>, that is a series of infrastructures connecting Myanmar to China\u2019s Yunnan province, via the construction of a&nbsp;<a href=\"http:\/\/www.xinhuanet.com\/english\/2020-01\/18\/c_138716099.htm\">deep-sea port<\/a>. Despite some voices that the harbour could be used in the future for&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/amti.csis.org\/kyaukpyu-china-indian-ocean\/\">military<\/a>&nbsp;purposes, the real Kyaukpyu\u2019s strategic value lies in its role as a hub for&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/thediplomat.com\/2020\/01\/has-the-us-lost-myanmar-to-china\/\">oil and gas pipelines<\/a>&nbsp;directly connecting it to China, alleviating so Malacca\u2019s issue.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>As it is evident, in the last years SEZs\u2019 role in Southeast Asia has started to move away from&nbsp;<strong>a mere economic dimension to acquire also a geopolitical one<\/strong>, and the growing competition taking place in the&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.ispionline.it\/it\/pubblicazione\/indo-pacific-towards-transformation-asias-geopolitics-20698\">Indo-Pacific<\/a>&nbsp;will likely have consequences also on these enclaves.&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Finally, other factors, as the aforementioned disruptions caused by Covid-19, the resulting appearance of\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/unctad.org\/en\/PublicationsLibrary\/unctad_oecd2020d23_summary_en.pdf\">emergency trade measures<\/a>\u00a0that could result in unfair practices and the\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/carnegieendowment.org\/2020\/06\/24\/in-u.s.-china-trade-war-new-supply-chains-rattle-markets-pub-82145\">trade tensions<\/a>\u00a0between US and China, may also have spill-over effects on these SEZs, either reducing or increasing their role in ASEAN\u2019s economic and strategic architecture. All in all, whatever impact these concurrent factors will eventually have on Southeast Asia\u2019s SEZs, one aspect emerges clearly: these enclaves represent a key element of analysis to be considered in order to understand regional dynamics.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><a href=\"https:\/\/www.ispionline.it\/it\/pubblicazione\/south-east-asian-special-economic-zones-are-becoming-geopolitical-26958\">Read more<\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p><small> 6 minutos<\/small> According to the latest World Bank\u2019s \u201cGlobal Economic Prospects\u201d publication, Covid-19 pandemic will have a negative impact on East Asia causing a&nbsp;-1,2% GDP\u2019s reduction in 2020, that is the region\u2019s first recession since 1998\u2019s Asian financial crisis, while China is expected to slow to 1% this year. Among the various consequences that may materialise, the report highlights the disruption of the global and regional value chains. In addition, as stated by&nbsp;UNCTAD World Investment Report 2020&nbsp;Foreign Direct Investments\u2019 (FDIs) flows are expected to <a href=\"https:\/\/www.abrazpe.org.br\/index.php\/2020\/07\/18\/south-east-asian-special-economic-zones-are-becoming-geopolitical\/\" class=\"more-link\"><span>Continue lendo<\/span>\u2192<\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":4,"featured_media":3763,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[5,7],"tags":[],"class_list":["entry","author-adm_hb2018","post-3762","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","category-artigos","category-noticias"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.abrazpe.org.br\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3762","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.abrazpe.org.br\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.abrazpe.org.br\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.abrazpe.org.br\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/4"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.abrazpe.org.br\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=3762"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/www.abrazpe.org.br\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3762\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":3764,"href":"https:\/\/www.abrazpe.org.br\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3762\/revisions\/3764"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.abrazpe.org.br\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/3763"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.abrazpe.org.br\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=3762"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.abrazpe.org.br\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=3762"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.abrazpe.org.br\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=3762"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}